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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Wisconsin v. Hurley, 604 N.W.2d 35 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
citation for placing concrete pad on lakebed without a permit was proper,
and order compelling landowner to remove improper portion of structure
did not violate due process).
Defendant, Larry Hurley, owned riparian property adjacent to an
artificial lake. The lake was created when a nearby navigable stream was
dammed, and the lake had maintained its current water level since 1968.
Hurley acquired his property in 1982. Hurley took several futile steps
since 1984 to prevent his property's shoreline from eroding. Finally, in
1996, Hurley, without a permit, placed several rocks encased in concrete
along his shoreline.
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") cited
Hurley for violating state statutes, and ordered him to remove a portion of
the concrete structure. Hurley challenged the DNR's decision and his
conviction, claiming the statute did not apply to him. He also argued the
lower court's order requiring him to remove part of his structure violated
due process. The Court of Appeals, however, thought differently.
Hurley initially claimed the statute he had allegedly violated was
First, Hurley argued that the statute
inapplicable for two reasons.
prohibited placing material or structures on the bed of any navigable water
below the established shoreline did not apply to his case because he had
placed the material on his own property. That is, it had been his property,
before it eroded and became part of the lakebed. Thus, Hurley claimed
that because the concrete's location was on land that had formerly been
Hurley's, he had not placed any material on the bed of a navigable
waterway.
Addressing this argument, the court looked at the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at trial. The court noted that both sides had presented
conflicting testimony regarding whether the structure was on the lakebed or
former private property. Recognizing the lower court had considered this
evidence and chosen to accept the DNR's evidence as true, the Court of
Appeals would not disturb the lower court's ruling.
Hurley next claimed the statute was inapplicable because the lake was
an artificial lake, and therefore the DNR lacked jurisdiction to cite him for
not having a permit. The court recognized that under state law, if an
artificial lake was created entirely on private property, the owner might
alter the lake in any legal way without recourse. In this case, however,
because the artificial lake was navigable and was not entirely on private
property, the DNR had authority to regulate its use. Additionally, the
court noted that when an artificial lake was created by damming a
navigable waterway, the DNR has regulatory authority despite the lake's
existence on private property. Therefore, Hurley was subject to the statute
and the DNR's authority, and the court affirmed the findings that Hurley
violated the statute.
Hurley finally claimed that the lower court's order requiring him to
remove a portion of the concrete structure violated due process. He argued
that he was entitled to a separate hearing before ordering removal. The
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DNR had argued for three alternative abatement levels: (1) complete
removal; (2) partial removal of everything that did not need a permit; or
(3) partial removal of only the portion for which DNR would not grant a
permit. Because the trial court ordered the alternative most favorable to
Hurley, allowing him to seek a permit from DNR to save some of his
structure, and noting the permit approval process would afford Hurley an
opportunity to be heard, the court ruled that the removal order did not
violate Hurley's due process rights. Thus, the court upheld Hurley's
conviction.
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